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Standard histories of the development of modern science
and philosophy has it that the mechanical philosophy was
driven by changes in physics that then required a reconceptualization of the metaphysics of substance. We
contest that this view is backwards. The revisions of the
metaphysics of substance occurred in the 14th century and
it underlined the well-known changes in physics in the 15th
and 16th centuries, which gave rise to mechanical
philosophy in the 17th century.

Aristotle made substance the center piece of his ontology.
This move raised a number of philosophical questions that
Aristotle only confronted in a piecemeal fashion. The three
most fundamental questions were:
•How does a substance retains it’s unity (continuity and
identity) through accidental change?
•How does a substance make a thing what it is?
•Where does a substance come from and where does it go
when it is destroyed?

Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), the most famous of
Aristotelians, tried to systematize Aristotle’s scattered
thoughts on these questions. He saw them as involving
and as being grounded in the notion of substantial form.
Substantial form is the thing that explains why the thing
has the essence it has and why the thing has the powers
it has. It is also what grounds the identity or unity of the
thing through accidental change, and furthermore it
explains substantial change by the final causal relations of
substantial forms in mixing and mixtures.

The Aristotelian framework developed by Aquinas was severely
criticized and rejected in the early 14th century by William
Ockham (1288-1348) and John Buridan (1300-1362). Their
criticism pushed in two directions. First was the rejection of
any forms, essences, or natures really distinct from the
individual substances themselves. Second was the replacing of
the Aristotelian/holistic view of substance with a mereological.
On this new view substantial forms had parts and were
divisible.
Comment: The result of this is that the unity of substance that
was so important for Aristotle and Aquinas is lost. This loss was
the basis for attempts to reintroduce substantial form in the
late 16th and 17th centuries, particularly by Francisco Suarez
and G.W.F. Leibniz.

In the commentary tradition on Aristotle’s Physics after
Buridan, thinkers applied this new conception of substance to
the problems of identity and continuity through change. A
number of concepts in physics has to be restructured in the
light of the new concept of substance.
Quantity is elevated from an accident to a quasi-substance,
and without substantial forms to account for the essence or
nature final causality disappears the is replaced with law like
regularities between things or parts of things. Powers are
reduced to the interactions of the parts of the substance. The
disappearance and reappearance of things are explained by
laws of nature.

The culmination of these trends were twofold. First the
recognition by Descartes that body is comprised of extension
and if theological commitments like the immortality of the
soul were to be possible, humans and their rational soul had
better be fundamentally distinct from bodily substances, And
second the recognition by Locke that primary substances –
whether bodily or mental – were simply collections of powers
or qualities inhering in and united by a some-thing-we-knownot-what. For what else could substance be once the concept
was ontologically reduced to nothing but quantity and powers
standing in regular, law-like relationships.
In conclusion: It is our contention that the conceptual shifts in
the ontology of substance not only pre-dated the rapid
developments in physics and mechanics in the 17th century,
but were moreover necessary for those developments that
are commonly termed “The Scientific Revolution” and “The
Rise of the Mechanical Philosophy.” Descartes and Locke
were not casting about for a new ontology of substance that
the developments in science and physics needed, but rather
were synthesizing changes that had already been made and
were antecedently necessary for the development of science
and physics.

